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The effect of allowing motorists to opt out 
of tort law in the United States 
Jeffrey O'CONNELL, Stephen CARROLL, Alan ABRAHAMSE, 
Michael HOROWITZ, Alexander KARAN* 
As applied to U.S. traffic accidents, both tort law and no-fault law are 
often attacked. A proposed solution would allow motorists to choose an 
option bypassing the inadequacies of both tort law and current U.S. no-
fault laws. Actuarial estimates indicate large savings available to motorists 
so choosing. But as time goes on, the savings are diminished as low 
required limits of coverage in the U.S. meet inflation, leading not only to 
admittedly lessened savings but also to the anomaly of more and more 
motorists in non no-fault states pursuing tort rights for only economic 
losses. 
Dans le domaine des accidents d'automobile, le droit commun et les 
législations spéciales font souvent l'objet de critiques aux États-Unis. Une 
proposition présentement à l'étude permettrait aux automobilistes d'obvier 
à ces critiques en choisissant le système d'indemnisation qui leur serait 
applicable. Des projections actuarielles font état d'économies substantiel-
les pour les automobilistes. Ces économies sont cependant en diminution 
depuis quelques années puisque les montants minimaux obligatoires d'as-
surance automobile n'ont pas suivi le taux d'inflation. Il en résulte que de 
plus en plus d'automobilistes, sous le droit commun, se contentent d'une 
réclamation pour leurs pertes de nature économique. 
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Traditional tort liability for personal injury from auto accidents has 
long been criticized on the grounds that its costs are too high and that any 
compensation therefrom is inefficient, unfair, and dilatory1. But no-fault 
laws2 themselves are criticized for infringing upon the fundamental legal 
right to be paid based on fault not only economic but also noneconomic 
damages (primarily for pain and suffering), and for failing in their promise 
to suppress auto insurance costs3. The latter criticism is countered with the 
argument that no-fault laws' financial shortcomings are due to preserving 
too many tort claims (above thresholds of either dollar losses or verbally 
described severity of injury) payable in addition to no-fault claims4. 
Is there a compensation scheme that can free us from the failures of tort 
law and at the same time mend the shortcomings of current no-fault laws ? 
See three articles by the same authors : « Consumer Choice in Auto Insurance Market », 
(1993) 52 AM. L.Rev. 1016 [hereinafter Maryland One] ; «The Cost of Consumer Choice 
for Auto Insurance in States Without No-fault Insurance», (1995) 54 Md. L. Rev. 281 
(written by the authors of Maryland One and D. KAISER) [hereinafter Maryland Two] ; 
and « The Comparative Costs of Allowing Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance in All 
Fifty States», (1996) 55 Md. L. Rev. (written by the authors of Maryland One and 
P. JAMIESON) [hereinafter Maryland Three]. See also : S.J. CARROLL, J.S. KAKALIK and 
D. ADAMSON, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Policy Perspective, Santa Monica, 
RAND, 1991, p. vii ; J. O ' C O N N E L L and C.B. KELLY, The Blame Game: Injuries, 
Insurance, And Injustice, Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1987, pp. 114-115. For 
other recent data supporting the various criticisms of traditional tort liability, see ge-
nerally: INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, Auto Injuries: Claiming Behavior And Its 
Impact On Insurance Costs, Oak Brook,1994 [hereinafter Claiming Behavior]. 
A no-fault law mandates the purchase of auto insurance payable by one's own insurer 
for economic loss without reference to fault, but also precludes accident victims from 
recovering noneconomic damages in tort unless they can prove another person was at 
fault and that their losses exceed a threshold defined by the no-fault law 
S J CARROLL J S KAKALIK and D ADAMSON OD cit note 1 D vii : J O ' C O N N E L L 
and C B K E L L Y OD cit note 1 D 118 
J O 'CONNEL L and C B KFTLY on cit note 1 n 120 
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The RAND Corporation, an organization specializing in statistical 
research, which takes a neutral position in matter, has published a study of 
auto compensation plans5. Terming insurance payable for economic loss 
without regard to fault personal injury protection (PIP) insurance6, RAND 
studied the following issues : 
1) The effect of PIP reform on a) the costs of compensation ; b) transac-
tion costs (mailnly lawyers' fees and allied costs of processing claims) ; 
c) « the adequacy and equity » of compensation ; and d) promptitude of 
compensation7. 
2) The effect of variations in the design of PIP reforms on items a)-d) 
above8. 
3) Variations in different states9. 
The RAND study came to the following conclusions : 
1) A PIP system can produce either substantial savings compared to the 
fault-based system or can increase costs, depending on the plan's 
design and variables in different states that affect auto insurance 
costs10—variables such as the size of PIP benefits, the nature and 
extent of any barrier to tort claims for noneconomic damages, the 
litigiousness of the state's populace, etc. ; 
2) PIP plans decrease transaction costs ' ' ; 
3) Compensation under PIP reforms aligns compensation with economic 
losses (mainly expenses for medical costs and wage loss) more closely 
than tort law12; 
4) Present PIP reforms eliminate compensation for noneconomic losses 
(mainly for pain and suffering) but only in cases of less serious inju-
ries13 ; 
5) Compensation is paid more promptly from PIP coverage14 ; 
5. See generally : S.J. CARROLL, J.S. KAKALIK and D. ADAMSON, op. cit., note 1. 
6. Insurance payments that do not take account of fault are usually termed personal injury 
protection or personal protection payments, in either case commonly nicknamed « PIP ». 
7. S.J. CARROLL, J.S. KAKALIK and D. ADAMSON, op. cit., note 1, p . vii. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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6) In choosing between traditional tort law and PIP reforms, policyma-
kers must determine « whether to cut costs or to preserve or increase 
compensation for injured people, and what balance to seek between 
compensation for economic and for noneconomic losses15. 
A good measure of an underlying cause for the rise in auto insurance 
premiums is the change in recent years in the ratio of bodily injury (BI) to 
property damage (PD) claims, i.e., the BI-PD ratio16. In other words the 
higher the ratio the more people are claiming for bodily injury. Nationally, 
that ratio has risen steadily—for example from 17.9 BI claims per 100 PD 
claims in 1980 to 29.5 per 100 by 199517. These recent increases in frequency 
of claims for personal injury are all the more dramatic for having occurred 
while many correlative indices have decreased. Technological advances and 
public policy initiatives have decreased both the frequency and severity of 
automobile accidents18. Examples include 1) safer cars containing collapsi-
ble steering wheels, padded dashboards, energy-absorbing fronts, and air-
bags ; 2) massive education and law enforcement campaigns against drunk 
driving ; 3) increased urbanization, with resultant lower rates of speed 
which diminish accident severity ; and 4) use of seat belts and child-restraint 
devices. According to a study by the Insurance Research Council, most of 
the additional automobile personal injury claims were for soft-tissue inju-
ries (e.g., sprains and strains to the neck and back)19, which, not coinciden-
tally, are difficult to diagnose objectively. At the same time there was a 
manifest drop in the number of automobile injuries that could be objectively 
diagnosed (e.g., broken bones), as well as a drop in hospital admissions and 
disabilities caused by automobile accidents20. Such decreases make a dra-
matic contemporaneous increase in bodily injury claim frequency all the 
more anomalous (Here again the problems are more acute in urban areas 
For example the frequency of BI claims in metropolitan Minneapolis is 
56 % higher than in the rest of Minnesota with average loss costs 52 % 
higher though the severity of accidents is aDoroximately 2 % lower21-) 
15. Ibid. 
16. See Maryland One, loc. cit., note 1, 1019-1020. 
17. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, Trends In Auto Bodily Injury Claims, Appendix A, 
table A-l (2nd ed., Wheaton, 1996) [hereinafter Trends]. 
18. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Statistical Abstract Of 
The United States 609, 112th ed., Washington, G.P.O., 1992 [hereinafter 1992 Statistical 
Abstract] ; D. POPES, «The Fraud Tax: The Cost of Hidden Corruption in America's 
Tax Law », Legal Backgrounder (27 March 1992) 1 (published by the Washington Legal 
Foundation). 
19. See Claiming Behavior, op. cit., note 1, p. 21. 
20. See id., p. 21 (Fig. 3-9). 
21. Trends, op. cit., note 17, Appendix B, table B-24. 
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How to explain the anomaly ? Obviously, the key is the increasing 
tendency of motorists (encouraged by their lawyers) to both make and 
inflate their claims, including, in no-fault states, to exceed the threshold 
above which claimants can « double dip » (being paid both by PIP benefits 
and tort liability insurance)22. Thus the often suggested reform is to 
strengthen the tort threshold by adopting a verbal threshold like in New 
York's, where one must suffer a « significant » injury before suing in tort as 
opposed to state laws which include only a dollar threshold, e.g., $2,000. 
But the key element—overlooked by the many who urge a New 
York-type high verbal threshold as a model for no-fault laws — is that even 
in New York, claims for pain and suffering above its high threshold are 
hugely expensive, contributing disproportionately to auto insurance costs. 
As indicated above23, the BI-PD ratio rose rapidly nationally from 1980 to 
1993. Contrast this with New York, with a high threshold barring pain and 
suffering claims ; there the BI-PD ratio remained very constant during the 
time period 1980 to 198924. But to illustrate the ill effects of BI tort claims, 
even New York's $50,000 in no-fault benefits contributed only 36 % of the 
total pure premiums for a category of claims including both BI tort claims 
and no-fault (PIP) benefits. In other words, the relatively few tort claims 
preserved over New York's high threshold contribute disproportionately 
(64 %) to total personal injury costs (including both BI and PIP coverages)25. 
Therefore, even New York's law is by no means an optimal model. In 
other words, if New York has long dealt relatively effectively with higher 
costs for smaller tort claims, even New York deals ineffectively with higher 
costs for larger tort claims. The only way to deal with both is to get rid of 
claims for noneconomic damages in cases both large and small. RAND has 
estimates that nationwide almost half of the bodily injury premiums are 
used paying for noneconomic losses in states like New York, which have 
high PIP benefits coupled with high thresholds26. Furthermore, even in New 
York the possibility of suing in tort above its relatively high threshold is 
being exploited by increasingly experienced plaintiffs' counsel. This acti-
vity has led to a more recent rise in New York's BI-PD ratio of almost 50 % 
from 1989 to 199327. Thus, simply reducing the number of tort claims for 
22. For data indicating major trends in claiming behavior in tort and in no-fault states 
compiled by the Insurance Research Council, see Appendix. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Trends, op. cit., note 17, table A-34. 
25. See Maryland One, loc. cit., note 1, 1019-1020. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Trends, op. cit., note 17, table A-34. 
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noneconomic loss over a higher threshold, including only a verbal definition 
as in New York, would fail to net optimal savings. 
1. A System Allowing Choice 
Presented here is reform called « auto choice » that replaces current 
tort law applicable to auto accidents burdened as it is in no-fault states not 
only with payments made without regard to fault for economic loss, but 
everywhere with expensive—and arguably even subsidized28—claims for 
both economic and noneconomic loss based on fault. 
Under the choice plan, motorists have a choice between the state's 
present system and a system that pays without regard to fault up to the 
state's no-fault required limit, or, in a state without no-fault, up to at least 
their state's financial responsibility level for bodily injury, while banning 
recovery for both large and small non economic losses. (The choice plan 
does not apply to claims for property damage, which remain as is). To 
repeat, this alternative coverage is called PIP29. Motorists who opt for the 
current system are required to purchase currently required coverages, inclu-
ding BI tort liability coverage to at least the state's financial responsibility 
level, and are also required to purchase a new form of insurance, tort 
maintenance (TM), up to at least the same level. Tort maintenance coverage 
pays the policy holder based on fault if injured by a motorist who opted for 
PIP. More on this below. They also have access to the same coverages no-
fault (in a no-fault state), medical payments (MP), uninsured motorist (UM), 
and underinsured motorist (UIM) available under the current system. 
To flesh all this out30, auto accident victims who elect the current 
system proceed under their state's current system if injured by a motorist 
who also elects the current system, or if injured by an uninsured motorist. 
The current system's rules also dictate the amount accident victims recover 
if injured by a motorist who elects PIP ; but, in this instance they would seek 
payment from their own insurer under their TM policy for any amount the 
PIP motorist would have owed them under the current system. In other 
words, in a tort state (i.e. a state without no-fault insurance, including an 
add-on statute), tort insured victims are paid by their own TM coverage for 
whatever amount the PIP motorist would have owed them had that motorist 
28. Maryland Two, loc. cit., note 1, 282 and note 7. 
29. See supra, note 6, and note 30 infra. 
30. For the terms of a bipartisan federal auto choice bill, see : S. 625, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1997). 
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elected tort. For example, presently, if motorists A and B are involved in an 
accident, A is entitled to payment for both his economic and noneconomic 
losses to the extent that B was tortiously responsible for the accident. As a 
practical matter, A seeks payment from motorist B's insurer or, if B is 
uninsured and A has UM coverage, from his own insurer. Under choice, if 
A had elected tort and B PIP, A would still be entitled to payment for both 
his economic and noneconomic losses to the extent that B was responsible 
for the accident, but, A would seek payment from his own insurer (under his 
TM coverage) just as he would if B were uninsured and A had UM coverage. 
Under choice in a no-fault state, insured victims staying under the 
current system would be paid for their economic loss by their own no-fault 
coverage up to the policy limit, and, if their injury surmounted the tort 
threshold, by their TM coverage for whatever amount above the threshold 
the PIP motorist would have owed them had that motorist also elected the 
current system. 
In any state, then, accident victims who elected PIP would be paid 
without regard for fault by their PIP insurance for any economic losses 
resulting from an auto accident, including accidents involving motorists 
who elected their state's current system, up to the PIP policy limit. Moto-
rists electing PIP could neither claim, nor be claimed against, for non-eco-
nomic losses31. Uninsured motorists who are injured would proceed as 
under their state's current system if injured by a motorist who elects the 
current system or by another uninsured motorist. Uninsured motorists 
injured by a motorist who elects PIP would seek payment based on fault 
from the other motorist for economic losses in excess of the mandated PIP 
limit. 
Under choice, motorists who choose either tort of PIP bind their 
resident relatives to that choice. And motorists, whether electing the current 
system or PIP, would be liable in tort to those they injure for economic 
losses in excess of the applicable TM coverage (if the victim elected the 
current system) or PIP (if the victim elected PIP). When such claims for 
excess economic loss are pressed, a reasonable attorney's fee would be 
recoverable, in addition to such excess economic loss32. 
31. The choice plan would allow any accident victim to recover under tort when the injury 
was caused by intentional misconduct or by a tortfeasor's alcohol or drug abuse. And 
PIP electors guilty of such misconduct would forfeit their PIP benefits. Because of data 
and resource limitations, these provisions are not considered in RAND's cost analysis. 
32. Maryland One, loc. cit., note 1, 1026-1027. 
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2. Research Approach 
There follows an estimate, based on research by RAND, based in turn 
on 1992 data, of how a plan that offered a choice between tort and PIP would 
affect the costs of auto insurance in states with33 and without34 a no-fault 
law. 
3. Findings 
The results indicate that the choice plan can dramatically lower the 
costs insurers incur in paying people injured in automobile accidents 
whether a state currently has a no-fault law or not. If insurance premiums 
are proportional to compensation costs, motorists in most states who opt 
for PIP could buy their personal injury coverages, for about 46 % less on 
average than what they pay for those coverages under their state's current 
auto insurance system35. Because personal injury coverages amount to a 
little less than half of total auto insurance premiums (with property damage 
coverages amounting to just over half), this reduction translates into a 
roughly 20% reduction in the average policyholder's total auto insurance 
premium36. The estimated savings vary little with the fraction of motorists 
who elect PIP : For example, if half of all insured motorists in tort states 
switch to PIP under choice, they will save an average of 20 % on their total 
insurance premiums ; if all insured motorists switch, their savings will 
33. Because of a misunderstanding when the data were collected, the New Jersey claims in 
RAND's database may not be representative of the distribution of auto insurance claims 
in that state. Accordingly, RAND excluded New Jersey in its analysis. Although Con-
necticut repealed its no-fault law in 1993, RAND's data describes the outcomes of claims 
closed in 1992 under the no-fault plan then in place. Accordingly, the results for Con-
necticut pertain to its prior system. 
34. Georgia repealed its no-fault law in 1991. RAND data composed of outcomes of claims 
closed in 1992, including both claims filed under the earlier no-fault regime and claims 
filed under the tort regime. Because RAND's ability to determine which regime affected 
any particular claim is limited, it excluded Georgia from this analysis. Pennsylvania 
offers motorists a choice plan between tort or a verbal threshold, no-fault plan. In its 
analysis, RAND examined the effects of the proposed choice plan on policyholders who 
elected either option. The effects of the plan on Pennsylvania motorists who opted for 
tort were included in the results presented for the tort states ; the effects of the plan on 
Pennsylvania motorists who opted for the verbal threshold were included in the results 
for the no-fault states. 
35. S.J. CARROLL and A.F. ABRAHAMSE, The Effects of a Choice Automobile Insurance 
Plan on Insurance Costs and Compensation; an Updated Analysis, Santa Monica, 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 1998, p. 19. 
36. Ibid. 
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average about 19 %37. These estimates represent overall averages : Indivi-
dual motorists would realize greater, or smaller savings, depending on 
factors such as their driving record and where their car is garaged and on the 
personal injury and property damage coverages and policy limits purchased. 
At the same time, the plan will have little effect on those who opt for 
coverage under their state's current system. As indicated above, if injured 
by a motorist who elected PIP they would seek recovery for their losses 
from their own insurer under TM rather than from the other motorist's 
insurer as would be the case under the current system. Because, as pointed 
out above38, the rules that govern the amount that those who opt tor 
coverage under their state's current system can recover remain the same, 
there is no significant change in the insurance premiums is projected for 
those who elect to stay in their state's current system39. 
Extrapolating from these most recent RAND cost estimates, the staff 
of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the United States Congress has 
provided its own cost estimates. Based on RAND's findings and further 
insurance industry data, the JEC estimates that auto choice would save over 
$35.5 billion in 1998 if all motorists chose PIP and $193 billion between 1998 
and 2002. The average policy holder would save $184 per year per car40 (See 
Table below). 
37. Id., 20. Note also that the savings for PIP insureds are slightly higher with 50% of 
motorists PIP insureds than with 100%. The reason is bottomed on the fact that a PIP 
insured must pay the economic loss of the person he tortiously injures above that 
person's PIP or tort maintenance coverage. See supra, note 32 and accompanying text. 
It is assumed that motorists who stay in the tort system will buy tort maintenance 
coverage at the same limits that they buy coverage under the present tort system, with 
many motorists today buying more than the state financial responsibility limits. On the 
other hand, it is assumed that motorists will buy only the minimum PIP insurance 
limits which is consistent with what PIP insureds do today in no-fault states. Thus 
the exposure of PIP insureds to tort payment for economic loss above their victims' 
first party limits would be somewhat higher as more motorists are insured for PIP. 
38. See supra, note 35, pp. 5-6. 
39. See Maryland One, loc. cit., note 1, 1038. 
40. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, Auto Choice : Im-
pact on Cities and the Poor, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 34. 
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According to the JEC Report : 
Lower income drivers would enjoy significantly higher savings—36 percent on 
average. Since low-income families, by definition, have less disposable income, 
they often forgo the optional collision and comprehensive property damage cove-
rages. As a result, the personal injury savings represent a larger share of their 
overall premium. The potential Auto Choice savings represent real savings for 
low-income households. [Even t]he average [lower] savings of only $184 is the 
equivalent of five weeks of free groceries, or free electricity for four months41. 
Table 1 
Estimated 1998 savings from Auto Choice42 
Private Commercial Total 
Average premium savings 22.8% 27.5% 23.7% 
Average savings per car $184 — — 
Savings for low-income drivers 36.0% — — 
Total available savings if 100 % switch (billions) $27.4 $8.1 $35.5 
4. Why 1992 Based Percentage Savings Are Lower Than 1987 
Based Results 
Earlier studies by RAND and the JEC reported greater savings than 
reported above. Use of a 1987 database indicated that the choice plan would 
reduce BI compensation costs about 60% (versus about 45 % under 1992 
data), translating into a roughly 30 % reduction in premiums (versus ap-
proximately a 21 to 23 % reduction under 1992 data)43. Why the difference ? 
Economic losses from auto accidents increased from 1987 to 1992. 
Accident victims in RAND's 1992 database suffered economic losses that 
41. Id., 31. 
42. Id., 34. 
43. Compare A. ABRAHAMSE and S. CARROLL, The Effects of a Choice Automobile Insu-
rance Plan Under Consideration by the Joint Economic Committee of the United States 
Congress, Santa Monica, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 1997, p. 1, with A. ABRA-
HAMSE and S. CARROLL, The Effects of a Choice Automobile Insurance Plan on Insu-
rance Costs and Compensation : An Updated Analysis, Santa Monica, RAND Institute 
for Civil Justice, 1998, p. 4. Compare also, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, The Benefits and Savings of Auto Choice, Washington D.C., 1997, 
pp. 8-9, with JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, op. cit., 
note 40, pp. 34-35. 
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were significantly greater, on average, than losses suffered by accident 
victims under RAND's 1987 database. In California, as an example, 1987 
accident victims incurred an average of $5,433 (1987 dollars) in economic 
losses, whereas 1992 California accident victims incurred an average of 
$10,286 (1992 dollars)44. But motorists have generally not increased their 
policy limits to keep pace with the rate of growth in losses. Nor has the law 
required them to do so (so expensive are current limits in the eyes of state 
legislatures)45. As a larger fraction of 1992 accident victims' economic 
losses neared insurance policy limits, payment from total auto insurance 
grew at a slower rate than did economic losses claimed. For example, the 
ratio of auto insurance payment to economic loss in California fell from 1.04 
in 1987, to 0.88 in 199246. The result : more and more auto insurance payment 
went for economic, not noneconomic, losses. Thus eliminating nonecono-
mic damages results in lower savings. Thus, in turn, 1992-based estimates of 
the cost of compensating auto accident victims for economic losses alone 
under the choice plan are greater and, hence, its updated estimates of the 
plan's savings from eliminating payment for noneconomic losses, are lower 
than were the earlier 1987-based estimates. 
This is a « bad news, good news » scenario for advocates of choice auto. 
The « bad news » is that the percentage savings for motorists who choose 
PIP decline as passing years inflate economic losses from auto accidents 
while financial responsibility limits remain stable. The « good news » from 
the point of view of choice auto advocates is that the tort system as the years 
go by is paying less and less for noneconomic loss and more and more for 
only economic loss — and paying for the latter based on fault. If motorists 
are to be paid only for economic loss, critics of the tort system might ask, 
why filter such payment though a fault-based system with all its attendant 
transaction costs, including one third for the claimant's lawyer, increasingly 
now extracted not from the « extra » payment for pain and suffering but 
from the amount meant to pay for the client's own economic losses ? (In this 
connection, recall that under the auto choice proposal, when payment is 
made only for economic loss based on fault, a reasonable attorney's fee is 
paid by the liability insurer in addition to economic loss47). 
44. See supra, note 35, p. 41. 
45. Ibid. An exception is New York, which increased its limits in 1995 from 10/20/5 to 
20/50/10. 
46. Ibid. 
47. See supra, note 32 and accompanying text. 
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Early on, the debate over paying for auto injuries was not so much over 
cuts in premiums, but over which type of insurance, tort liability with 
common law damages or payment without reference to fault for only eco-
nomic loss, provides better value for the consumer48. In part, at least, the 
debate seems to be reverting to that issue49. 
48. R.E. KEETON and J. O'CONNELL, Basic Protection/or the Traffic Victim, Toronto, Little, 
Brown, 1965, pp. 292-295. 
49. Some attention has recently been focused on modest reductions to auto insurance 
premiums in several states. See, e.g., J.B. TREASTER, « Auto Insurance Is Now Cheaper 
In Many States », The New York Times (15 April 1998) Al. Due to successful investing 
by the insurance companies, less drunken driving, and reductions in crash severity on 
account of anti-lock breaks and air bags, some insurers have begun to reduce premiums. 
The Insurance Information Institute projects that rates will drop over all by an average 
of one percent this year, to $692 for the average policy (ibid.). Such marginal reductions, 
however, will do little to make insurance all that affordable—note that premiums had 
tripled in the last two decades. Note also that premiums continue to rise in some states 
and in parts of states where the overall average is lower. Some drivers hit hardest by 
skyrocketing insurance premiums (ibid.) for example most drivers in New lersey, 
which continues to have the highest rates in the nation will receive no relief from the 
recent decreases in premiums (ibid.). Not only are such reductions too marginal to 
obviate the need for comprehensive auto insurance reform at present but they are also 
not likely to keep rates from rising in the future Higher medical and legal costs more 
lawsuits and fluctuating interest rates can easily set auto insurance rates climbing again 
in all areas including those areas where premiums have slightly fallen Already pre-
miums are far too expensive for a substantial proportion of America's drivers so that 
some slight and temporary good news ought not stand in the way of sensible reform 
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' Appendix 
A. Four trends" 
1. More people involved in auto accidents are making claims for injuries, even though 
accident rates declining because of : 
a) increased seat belt use ; 
b) increased use of air bags ; 
c) tougher DWI (Driving While Intoxicated) laws. 
2. Many additional claims for relatively minor injuries 
3. Medical expenses climbing rapidly 
4. People more likely to hire attorney for help 
B. Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Claims- 1980-1995b 
1. Claim frequency - up 1.1 % 
2. Claim severity-up 157 % 
3. Average loss cost - up 160 % 
C. Bodily Injury (BI) Claims-1980-1995° 
1. Claim frequency - up 38.6 % 
2. Claim severity-up 100.1 % 
3. Average loss cost - up 176.7 % 
D. Property Damage (PD) Trends -1980-1995, down 16.2 % (frequency)*1 
E. Number of BI Claims per 100 PD Claims (i.e., measures llkellhood of injury claim being 
paid given an accident serious enough to cause some danger) ; 1980-1995 increased 
64.8 % (17.9 to 29.5)e 
F. Insurance Research Council additional data based 1987-1994 supports trendsf 
1. Average injury loss costs (BI, PIP, UM, UIM) up 52.1 % (6.2 % per year) 
2. Average property damage loss costs up 26.9 % (3.5 % per year) 
3. Injury-to-property damage cost index up 19.8 % (2.6 % per year) 
G. Insurance Research Council Study of 62,000 closed claims nationwide supports trends^ 
1. Sprains/strains growing share of all injuries 
a) BI claimants, 1987-1992, 66 % to 71 % 
b) PIP claimants, 1987-1992,58 % to 62 % 
2. BI and PIP claimants with no recorded periods of disability, 1977-1992h 
a) BI-40%to59% 
b) PIP-45%to56% 
3. Medical Expenses Climbing' 
a) 1977 - medical expenses 2/3 of total economic loss ; 
average economic loss $1,162 
b) 1992 - medical expenses 3/4 of total economic loss ; 
average economic loss $4,532 
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4. Attorney representation countrywide-all coverages combined increased signifi-
cantlyj. 
a) 1977-31 % 
b) 1987-42% 
c) 1992-46% 
Notes 
a
 INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, Trends In Auto Bodily Injury Claims, 2n d ed., Wheaton, 
1996, Part One, pp. 1-4. 
b
 Id., Appendix A, table A-l . 
c
 Ibid. 
d
 Ibid. 
e
 Ibid. 
f INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, Auto Injuries: Claiming Behavior and its Impact on 
Insuranee Costs, Oakbrook, 1994, p. 19 (Fig. 3-3). 
I Ibid. 
h Id., p. 23 (Fig. 3-8). 
1 Id., p. 3. 
i Id,, p. 44. 
